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Risk Taking, Guarantees, Securitization and the Option to Change Strategy: 
The Economics of Pulling a Fast One 
 
 
This paper analyzes the risk-taking behavior of financial intuitions that have 
guarantees (e.g., banks with deposit insurance or Government Sponsored Enterprises 
with implicit guarantees) and/or institutions that find it beneficial to develop a 
reputation for not taking risk. For instance, banks putting together asset-backed 
securities have a choice of delivering the riskiest loans they can get away with or 
putting safe loans into deals because developing a reputation for selling good 
securities will get them larger fees later. The paper focuses on the following questions: 
Is it rational for financial institutions to take on less risk than they can get away with, 
and if it is rational, under what conditions will they shift strategies and increase their 
risk after having established a reputation for low risk? To answer the question we 
allow for future benefits from survival in the form of “franchise value,” which comes 
from a good reputation and/or from continuing to receive a guarantee, and which they 
might lose if they increase risk. With franchise value they might take less risk than 
they are allowed; however, if they experience large enough negative shocks, they can 
reach a tipping point where they will change their strategy discontinuously, and 













This paper analyzes the risk-taking behavior of financial intuitions that have 
guarantees (e.g., banks with deposit insurance or Government Sponsored Enterprises 
with implicit guarantees or any of the financial institutions (FIs) around the world that 
are “Too Big To Fail”) or institutions that find it beneficial to develop a reputation for 
not taking risk. For instance, banks putting together asset-backed securities (ABS) 
have a choice of delivering the riskiest loans they can get away with or putting safe 
loans into deals because developing a reputation for selling good securities will get 
them larger fees later. The bailouts of different institutions like Bear Stearns, Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, and the American International Group (AIG) by the US 
government, and the apparent de facto coverage of European bank depositors suggest 
that most important financial intuitions have some sort of financial guarantee along 
with options to use the guarantees strategically. Changes in underwriting standards 
associated with securitizing subprime loans and the recent unraveling of that market 
suggest that strategic behavior of FIs putting together ABS deals are subject to 
possibly large changes in strategic decisions about risk-taking. 
 
The paper focuses on two questions: Is it rational for FIs to take on less risk than they 
can get away with; and if it is rational, under what conditions will they shift strategies 
and increase their risk after having established a reputation for low risk? To answer 
the first question we allow for future benefits from survival in the form of franchise 
value, which comes from a good reputation or from continuing to receive a guarantee, 
and which they might lose if they increase risk. With franchise value they might take 
less risk than they are allowed. However, if they experience large enough negative 
shocks, they can reach a tipping point where they will change their strategy 
discontinuously, and “gamble for resurrection.” Our contribution is to bring future 
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considerations into strategic behavior. 
 
We focus first on the case of a bank with a guarantee; we return to the (isomorphic) 
securitization application later on. We model the guarantee as having two parts: a 
current guarantee, which is a put option that guarantees debt until the next “audit,” 
and a franchise value, which is the right to future benefits of the bank’s charter, 
including access to future guarantees, if the institution passes the audit. That there is a 
cost to defaulting in the form of losing a valuable asset, the franchise, can limit the 
institution’s risk-taking even though it could get away with a large amount of 
risk-taking after its audit. However, bad luck during a particular period can increase 
risk-taking, and perhaps in a very abrupt way. Hence, an important part of the value of 
a guarantee is in the option to change strategy between audits, or the option to 
“Gamble for Resurrection.”  
 
Our point of departure is a well known model of deposit insurance by Merton (1977), 
which uses the Black-Scholes option pricing model to price deposit insurance and 
other guarantees. It does this by modeling the guarantee as a put option which would 
be exercised at the end of an audit if the bank has negative net worth. The model has 
been used in empirical work, for example, Marcus and Shaked (1984), Ronn and 
Verma (1986). These papers found that deposit insurance was apparently overpriced, 
given estimated parameters of the option model. However, the widespread losses 
caused by failures in the Savings and Loan Industry in the 1980s suggest that 
overcharging for insurance was not a problem.  
 
We find that FIs have incentives to take on a low level of risk for sufficiently high 
franchise value and/or asset value. They will adjust their strategy if there are changes 
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in asset value, with small adjustments for small shocks. However, there are also 
threshold values of franchise and asset value that will trigger discontinuous changes 
(gambling for resurrection) in risk-taking. Something quite analogous happens with 
banks that put together structured securitization deals. Developing a good reputation 
by selling low risk securities is a sort of franchise, but strategy can change abruptly, 
for instance as competition and the range of risk possibilities increase.    
 
II. Background 
Debt has been widely studied using option pricing models. Earlier studies are Merton 
(1974), Geske (1977), Galai and Masulis (1976), and Galai (1988). All these studies 
price the value of firms’ debts as put options. Debt insurance, or more specifically 
deposit insurance, has also had a comprehensive literature. The first to model deposit 
insurance as a put option is Merton (1977). 
 
Merton (1978), Marcus and Shaked (1984), Ronn and Verma (1986) and others have 
developed option-based models of deposit insurance. For example, Ronn and Verma 
(1986) argue that while banks tend to take more risk given the existence of deposit 
insurance, risk-adjusted deposit insurance can provide incentives to the banks to limit 
risk-taking. They provide estimation on the level of risk and the value of a 
risk-adjusted deposit insurance premium. Furlong and Keeley (1989), using the 
state-preference model, find that high bank capital ratio requirements reduce the 
incentive for increasing asset risk and that value-maximizing banks will increase their 
capital rather than reduce debt in order to meet the more stringent requirements.  
 
Ritchken et. al. (1993) model the shareholders’ equity of a bank as a combination of 
its charter value, which allows its continuous operation, and the value of the deposit 
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insurance, both of which are contingent claims. Park (1997) extends the study to solve 
for the optimal capital ratio and the proportion of the bank’s assets invested in the 
risky project. Episcopos (2004) develops an option model that is used to find the 
optimal fund reserves for the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF), and it illustrates the results 
using a sample of 40 US chartered bank holding companies in the top 50 rankings. 
Jeitchko and Jeung (2005) provide a theoretical framework that shows that the choice 
of high-risk investment is a consequence of meeting stringent capital standards. They 
further investigate the incentives for risk-taking from the viewpoints of the deposit 
insurer, the shareholder, and the bank manager. 
 
On the question of revising strategy, Foster et al (1994) use a VAR model to capture 
both credit risk and interest rate risk for a representative bank with deposit insurance 
and use the model to show that the ability to switch strategy in mid year (between 
audits) from just credit risk to both credit and interest rate risk in the event of a 
negative shock during the period greatly increases the value of the bank’s deposit 
insurance. However, they do not explain why the bank does not take on both risks 
right from the beginning. Schwartz and Van Order (1988) develop an option-based 
model of the behavior of Fannie Mae in the early 1980s when it had negative net 
worth. They find that the implied volatility of Fannie Mae’s assets did indeed go up, 
but not by very much, suggesting that value of Fannie Mae’s charter, its implied 
guarantee and favorable position in the mortgage market, provided franchise value 
that limited its risk-taking even when it was in trouble. But that paper also did not 
develop a model of why they changed strategy. 
 
III.  Modeling Debt Guarantees: The Put Option Model  
We model a guarantee that begins with a Merton-like model of deposit insurance. 
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Regulators have information about capital and have capital regulations, but are only 
imperfectly able to control risk-taking. In particular, we assume that they are unable to 
control risk-taking between audits. To simplify the problem setting, we assume that 
the debt is completely insured, and the insurance is not priced. We can interpret the 
length of time until the maturity of the insurance as the amount of time until the next 
audit by the guarantor of the debt with the total amount of debt throughout the period 
assumed constant. Then the guarantee is defined by an audit period and a rule for 
closure if the audit is failed. This is a convenient, if simple, metaphor for actual 
closure rules and capital requirements. 
 
We assume that interest rates are constant, which is a simplification that leaves out an 
important part of risk. In terms of option valuation with stochastic interest rates, 
Rabinovitch (1989) has provided a closed form solution for call options with 
stochastic risk-free rates (see also Vasicek (1977) for more details). Adding a 
stochastic rate adds complications to the modeling and analyzing processes. For 
instance, when pricing bank loans subject to default risk, Grenadier and Hall (1996) 
also consider a stochastic interest rate in the valuation of defaultable loans. They 
suggest that closed-form solutions are possible for certain stochastic process 
specifications. However, their proposal that numerically solving the governing 
equation by finite-difference methods is preferable highlights the complications of 
analytical solutions, if they exist.  
 
Ronn and Verma (1986) show that if interest rates are described by a lognormal 
diffusion process, the value of equity as a call option can still be used to obtain the 
value of the firm and its corresponding variance by incorporating the variance of the 
interest rate and the covariance between the value of the firm and the interest rate. In 
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other words, the existence of stochasticity in interest rate need not seriously 
complicate the valuation of deposit insurance. They also claim that estimates of 
deposit insurance premium will not be seriously affected by breaking the assumption 
of constant interest rate. We do not introduce stochastic interest rates, but rather stay 
within the Black-Scholes framework with fixed interest rates because it is easier to 
manipulate. However, it is probably the case that a major source of quick changes in 
risk comes from changes in interest rate risk.  
 
The Model 
Consider a Financial Institution, which we call a bank, with a liability structure that 
consists of equity, E, and insured debt (including interest), D. If the bank’s asset value, 
V, falls short of D (that is, it cannot repay the debt when they mature at time T), then 
the insurer will pay the debt holders the shortfall. Then the value of the insurance to 
the bank at time T is 
 ( )[ ]0,TtTrT VDeMaxP −= −                 (1) 
where r is the risk-free rate, and t is the time the insurance is valued.  
 
The value of the bank’s assets at any time t is V, which is a random variable following 
a geometric Brownian motion, that is, 
 VdzdtVdV vv σμ +=                (2) 
where µv and σv are, respectively, the instantaneous mean and volatility of dV, and dz 
is the Wiener process. It is obvious from (1) that the value of the insurance at any time 
t is a European put option with D as the exercise price. The premium of such a 
single-period put, representing the full deposit insurance under risk neutral pricing is 
given by 
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The value of the bank is the value of a call on the assets at the end of the period, 
which is equivalent to the put in equation (3) plus the initial equity put up by the bank, 
V – D. Once initial equity is set, maximizing wealth implies choosing the optimal 
value of tP , which is equivalent to maximizing volatility (because tP  is increasing 
in σv). 
 
We extend this model to a two-period case by considering what happens at the end of 
the period and its link to the period after. We assume that if the bank survives, it 
continues to get insurance under the same conditions as in the first period. Hence, 
there is a benefit in the form of access to future benefits.  
 
IV.  Choosing the Level of Risk 
We assume that the bank is alive for one or two periods. Its portfolio is a combination 
of two assets, a risky one and a safer one with asset volatilities given by hvσ  and 
l
vσ , 
respectively. It is possible that .0=lvσ By choosing its portfolio it also chooses its 
risk level, vσ , which we take to be the choice variable; vσ  must be between 
h
vσ  and 
l
vσ . If it survives the first period, it reconstitutes itself with free insurance during the 
  9
second period. During the terminal period it will take as much risk as possible 
because there is no cost to risk-taking. Hence, the value of the guarantee (the put 
option) on bank’s assets in the second period is fixed at P*, which is given by valuing 
the guarantee with risk level hσ . We investigate the extent to which access to the 
second period guarantee and other benefits limit risk taking in the first period. 
 
We further assume that beyond the access to future guarantees, the bank also enjoys 
franchise value, which may come from tax breaks, monopoly power, regulatory 
privileges and/or management perks. We model franchise value as coming from two 
sorts of benefits: those that are fixed, F(T – t), such as management perks, that are 
independent of asset choice as long as the firm is alive, and are proportional to the 
length of the period between audits, and those that depend on the assets the firms hold, 
such as excess return on the risky asset (but not the safe one). This benefit is assumed 
to depend on the risk, σv, that the bank chooses to take on and is given by ( )tTf v −)(σ ; 
i.e., it too is proportional to the length of the period.  
 
Then the bank has an implicit asset, which is the sum of the benefits of future 
guarantees and franchise value. These are given by: 
 
 Pt + F(T-t)+ )(( tTf v −σ )≡ Bt                                              (4) 
 
F(T – t) in the first period is given and is not subject to optimization, but the 
probability of staying alive to get it next period is. In the final period Bt is equal to B*, 
the level of Bt where σv = σh. It is predetermined, because in the last period the bank 
always chooses the maximum risk. The bank’s total assets are  
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 At = Vt + Bt                                                   (5)                
 
We begin by assuming that the bank sets a risk level at the beginning of the period to 
maximize the present value of wealth including the value of the implicit assets, and 
then sticks with that level during the period. We then extend the model to the 
introduction of an option to change that policy midway through the period, for 
instance, because asset values have fallen and shareholders equity has been eroded. 
 
At the beginning of each period, the bank starts with a predetermined level of D and V, 
with V set by regulators once D is chosen and a corresponding capital ratio, V/D, set 
by the regulators. Let v = V/D and v = 0v  > 1 be what is required at the beginning of 
each period. We assume that vσ  is the only instrument that the bank can choose to 
maximize wealth. 
 
The position of the bank at the beginning of the period is both a call on its assets, or 
equivalently an equity position with a put, and current excess income from the 
franchise. Again, the fixed value in the current period is unaffected by the 
optimization, but the other income, ( )tTf v −)(σ , is not. The call has the advantage 
that if exercised the banks gets a free put and the franchise value next period. Then the 





















,* 1  (6) 
 
That is, we can model this as equivalent to a call option on V with exercise price D, 
but which also pays off an amount B* (the put and the franchise value for the second 
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period) if the option is exercised. The bank is defined by its level of debt, which we 
take as fixed. Then letting r = 0, vln=ρ , and tTv −= σσ , b=B*/D, 
h
vσ
htT σ=− , lvσ













The value of the firm, W, is given by 
 
)),(())((),( 2 σσσ vdbNtTfFvcW +−++=                           (7) 
 
where ( )σ,vc  is the value of a Black-Scholes call option on the debts divided by D. 
Its value is given by 1−+ v
D
Pt . The last term is the franchise benefit available only if 
the call is exercised, times the risk-neutral probability of exercising the call, all 
divided by D. The bank chooses σ to maximize W. 
 
First we turn to the first order conditions. Differentiating equation (7) with respect to 
σ gives 
 














      (8)            
 
This shows that there can be a tradeoff: the first and last terms are positive, depicting 
the effect of increasing risk on the current positive guarantee for sufficiently high 
level of risk, while the second is the effect of increased risk on the value of the next 
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period, which can be (but is not necessarily) negative.. 
 
Then noting that 
























dbdNvtTfW                             (9) 
 
We begin with the simple case where franchise value is fixed, so that ( )σf ′ = 0. In 
that case the first order condition is 
 



























.                  (10) 
This has two solutions. One is N’(d1) = 0, which is approached as σ approaches 0 and 
which is also a corner solution. The other is when the second term in parenthesis is 
zero, or 
 







                                         (11) 
 
Because the required level of v, v0, is greater than one ρ > 0. Then the right hand side 
of (11) is negative; and there is no solution if b > 2.1 In that case franchise value is so 
large that wealth is always decreasing in risk and the bank always chooses the least 
                                                 
1 Note that this implies that the franchise value is twice the level of deposits. While this may seem like 
large, in the case where a manager weighs his perks high relative to shareholder value, b can be quite 
high. 
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risk. If that is not the case (or, b < 2), then there is a unique solution for a positive 
level of risk.  
 
The second order condition is 
 
























































ddbdbdddNv  < 0.                   (12) 










Hence for positive equity, this gives the solution to solving the problem of minimizing 
the bank’s wealth given that it is going to have maximum risk is the second period. 
Figure 1 shows the wealth of the bank with fixed franchise value as a function of risk. 

































Maximizing wealth leads to a corner solution. To see which corner is the solution, we 










associated with these two risk levels are 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )lll dbNcW σσσ 2+=  
and                   
( ) ( ) ( )( )hhh dbNcW σσσ 2+=                                       (13) 
We are interested in conditions where the bank chooses not to take the maximum risk; 
that is when ( ) ( ) 0<< lh WW σσ . Taking the difference between the two, we have 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )lhlhlh dbNdbNccWW σσσσσσ 22 −+−=−=Δ            (14) 
 
The net of the first two terms is positive because the value of a call is always 
increasing in risk. The net of the last two terms can be positive or negative. Normally 
we expect the low risk strategy to have a higher probability of survival. This will 
occur if *)ln(*)(2/1 vhl ≡≡−≥ ρσσρ  (obtained by solving ( )( ) ( )( )lh dNdN σσ 22 = ).  
If, however, *ρρ < , increasing risk increases both the value of the first period call 
option and the probability of survival. That requires negative equity. If equity is 
positive, there is always a value of b that makes Δ negative. This establishes that there 
are situations where the bank will take less than the maximum amount of risk 
allowed. 
 
We can characterize these situations by setting expression (14) equal to zero and 
solving for b as a function of v, which will give the locus of points for which the bank 
is indifferent between the high risk and low risk strategies. Points above that locus 
(high values of b given v) will be points where it is optimal to take the lowest possible 
risk during the first period. 
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From (14), the critical value for the bank is given by 
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 01 2211 =−−+− hllh dNdNbdNdNv                          (15)  
or 
( ) ( )










−= .                                 
                                             
The relationship between b and v looks as is depicted in Figure 3. Combinations 
above the curve imply the low risk strategy. There is a unique interval of b that cuts 
off high risk and low risk strategy given v > 1. Note that b approaches infinity as the 









It can also be shown (see Appendix) that b approaches zero as v approaches infinity, 






** = ) and b = 2 when 0=ρ  (or, v = 1). 


















We can define an equilibrium as one in which the required level of v at the beginning 
of each period, v0, is the same every period. This is the case where the regulator 
enforces the same capital rule every period. Let )( 0* vp be the value of the guarantee 
(put) associated with v0, and )( 0vb  be the associated terminal franchise value from 
equation (15). Then it can be shown that  
)()( 0*0 vpvb > .                                                (16) 
That is, the “breakeven” franchise value is greater than the put value. This implies that 
for the bank to take less than maximum risk, the franchise value must be greater than 
just access to the next period’s guarantee (otherwise it is better to take maximum risk 
now rather than waiting). There must be something extra, such as monopoly power or 
management perks. 
 
The high risk strategy is more likely to be chosen as the franchise value falls. In 
particular, because the low risk strategy is only chosen if the bank (or its management 
via perks) has some monopoly power, competition promotes risk taking. The choice 
also depends on the risk range; increasing the level of the highest risk increases the 
probability of taking high risk, and lowering the value of the low risk decreases it. 
 
Endogenous σl 
The assumption of a minimum risk level is awkward because banks always have 
access to Treasury bonds or other risk-free securities, in which case the minimum risk 
level is zero.2 However, we also want to use the model to analyze how firms revise 
their risk when they have a negative shock to asset value. This cannot be done with 
                                                 
2 It could be that the risk free strategy has negative value because of taxes and/or transaction costs. In 
that case the minimum risk would be the minimum associated with breaking even. 
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zero risk.3 Thus, returning to the full model in equation (8), we allow for the 
availability of risk free asset. To simplify, we let f(σ)(T-t) = f*(T-t)σ ≡ fσ. Including f(σ) 
leads to a straightforward result: Because the slope of W(σ) when f is zero, is zero 
when σ = 0, adding f makes the slope of W(σ)  positive at zero risk. This opens up 
the possibility that there will be an optimal interior solution for a low risk level, 
although it does not affect Figure 3 much.  
 
The first order condition is now 
 







dbdNvf .                                      (17) 
 








db                                                  (18) 
 
The second order condition is  
 































dNvW  < 0.    (19) 
 
Now it can be negative. In particular it can be seen that (19) is negative at σ = 0. Note 
that a necessary condition for an interior maximum is that the first part of (19) must 
be negative, which requires that 012 >dd . This implies 2
2σρ >  or σ>1d . 
 
Figure 4 below depicts the slope of the W(σ) curve, as in Figure 2. The horizontal line 
                                                 
3 There could be some level of operations risk that keeps risk positive even if the assets are risk free. 
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is -f, representing the slope of f(σ)(T-t). The intersection determines the optimal level 
of σl. Unless f is so large that it is entirely below the curve, there is an interior solution. 
Then there are two possible interior solutions; the smaller is a local maximum and the 
larger is a local minimum. Hence, we have a more complicated, but similar, model 
where the bank optimizes, choosing σl and then comparing wealth levels for σl and σh.  
 
         Figure 4: Interior solution for low risk level 
 
Figure 5 shows wealth as a function of risk, as was depicted in Figure 1, in the case 















    Figure 5 Wealth as a Function of Risk: The General Case 
 
 
There are still two possibilities; the difference now is that the minimum risk is 
endogenous and will respond to changes in data, like v or b. In the neighbourhood of 
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< 0.                                     (21) 
 
That is, an increase in franchise value that comes from the fixed part of it (e.g., 
management perks) will decrease risk taking.  
 
The actual strategy will either be σl as a function of v and b as determined above, or σh. 
The determination will be given by expression (15) except that σl is now a function of 
v. In this case we have to take account of the fact that σl is chosen optimally, so that 
∂W/∂v is replaced by dW/dv, with the latter including the effect of v on σl. However, 
because σl is chosen so as to maximize W(σ) the envelope theorem implies that the 
conditions are still the same (i.e., dW/dv = ∂W/∂v because ∂W/∂σl=0 ). Hence, the 
trade off is still given by a curve like that in Figure 3.  
 
If the bank is at an interior low risk solution, then a small decrease in asset value will 
cause it to take a small adjustment to risk. However, decreased asset value means a 
lower level of Wl. As v falls toward 1, Wl will approach Wh. When they become equal, 
there will be a discrete change in strategy and a discrete increase in risk-taking. 
 
V.  Changing Strategies 
Next we assume that the strategy of the (high or low) level of risk has been chosen at 
the beginning of the period, and with which the bank has the option to change half 
way through the period. Because σ includes both the volatility of the asset, V, and the 
square root of time until the audit, the choice of σ at any time is essentially the same 
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as at the beginning of the period. Figure 3 still applies. 
 
Assume that franchise value is high enough to induce the bank initially to choose the 
low risk strategy. From expression (15) above we see that the cut off for switching 
from a low risk to high risk strategy depends on the equity ratio, v. It must have begun 
greater than one by regulation, but it could have then fallen to a level below the 
cut-off level given by Figure 3. Hence, the “probability” of switching to a high risk 
strategy increases if the asset value declines for a given level of b. Furthermore, if v 
falls below v*, there will be a switch to maximum risk regardless of the franchise 
value. At this point high risk increases both the current call value and the probability 
of surviving.  
 
This is “gambling for resurrection”. Note that institutions with high franchise value 
may continue to pursue the low risk strategy even if they have negative equity, a 
possible explanation for the finding in Schwartz and Van Order (1988) that Fannie 
Mae did not take a large increase in risk despite negative equity in the early 1980s, in 
contrast to the more competitive Savings and Loan industry, which had little franchise 
value. The full model with f positive is consistent with high franchise institutions 
adjusting their risk a little, but not gambling for resurrection as v falls. The process of 
switching strategies applies in reverse. A bank that begins with a risky strategy and 
gets lucky (increase in v) might switch to the low risk strategy for the remainder of the 
period.  
 
The model suggests complications in pricing. The value of insurance is the value of 
the put for the first half of the period plus the expected value of the put in the second 
half of the period. Letting vc be the switch point from the safe to risky strategy and 
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p(v,σ) be the value of the put, the value of insurance, G, for an institution that starts 
out taking low risk is given by: 
( )( )
( )( )

























































































































, we depict the guarantee 
in terms of the basic put for the low risk strategy plus the expected difference in put 













































































The key difference from the Merton model is the last term, which is the expected 
value from switching. It explains why results of earlier models, such as Ronn and 
Verma (1986) might have suggested that deposit insurance was overpriced, because 
their model did not consider the option to change strategy.4  
 
Securitization 
A structured securitization (ABS) is quite similar to the corporate (limited liability) 
                                                 
4 Note that for an institution that starts out taking the high risk strategy there is a corresponding 
formula, which is less than the value corresponding to the first term of (22) because the bank might, if 
it gets lucky, switch to the low risk strategy. 
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structure of the bank described above. The simplest version is a senior/subordinated 
structure, where the senior part is like the bank debt above and the subordinated part 
like the equity. Assume that the subordinated part is kept by the bank and the senior 
part is sold to investors who know the initial value of the securities in the pool and the 
range of possible risk, but not the level of risk. They do not know even ex post the 
quality of the loans, whether they were high risk or low risk, but they do know if the 
bank’s last deal paid off. If it did then the bank receives a premium, b, for its next deal. 
Hence, the bank guarantee model can be used to analyze a simple securitization 
structure. For simplicity, we assume that the value of b is independent of the asset mix, 
so we do not analyze an endogenous low risk level. Note, as above, that b has to be 
greater than the terminal value of the put for the low risk level to be chosen. That is, 
the bank needs some sort of extra income (or management perks or fees) for the low 
risk strategy to work. We assume that investors know the asset value at the time the 
pool is formed and the asset to debt ratio is what is needed for the senior tranche to 
get an AAA rating assuming that the low risk strategy is followed. Hence, we can 
reuse Figure 3.  
 
If the deal allows active management of the pool after it is formed, then the analysis 
of changing strategy between audits goes through as above. The bank will tend to 
substitute risky assets for safer assets in a discontinuous way if asset values fall below 
the critical value. If active management is not allowed, then the changes in strategy 
take place at the beginning of the period as the bank decides on whether or not to 
trade currently profitable risk-taking with future reputation. A bank that suddenly 
loses franchise value (e.g., the monopoly power was temporary and competition 
lowers b) has an incentive to move to the risky strategy. Similarly, an increase the risk 
of the riskiest asset (and an increase in the risk of the safest asset) will tend to increase 
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the level of risk, as will awareness by the bank (but not inventors) that the underlying 
securities are overvalued.  
 
I. Conclusions 
This paper explains the importance of franchise value to the risk-taking strategies of 
financial institutions that have debt guarantees or the option of trading less risk   
now for high fees later in putting together structured asset-backed securities. It 
develops a model of the option to change strategy. Institutions with high franchise 
values tend to adopt low risk strategies that will allow them to pass audits and capital 
requirements.  
 
Institutions such as the Savings and Loans in the 1980s with weak franchise value are 
more likely to take on risk, and institutions with strong franchises may be able to 
grow out of problems without increasing risk even if their “market” value is negative. 
However, financial institutions also have incentives to make abrupt changes in 
strategies if asset values decline (gambling for resurrection). The cost of financial 
guarantees may come more from the option to take high risk in the future than from 
the risk embedded in the bank’s current portfolio. 
 
Similarly, the model suggests reasons for sharp changes in the risk of structured ABS 
deals, as was the case recently with subprime mortgages. The incentive to deliver 
relatively safe loans in exchange for a reputation diminishes as competition increases, 
the risk range increases (e.g., the discovery that market will tolerate or not know 
about diminished underwriting quality), and the underlying assets become 
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Why b approaches zero as v approaches infinity 
 
Manipulating (15) it can be seen that 
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We are interested in knowing what b approaches when v goes to infinity. Since all the 
cumulative normal distributions in the fraction approach 1 as v approaches infinity, 
we have the indeterminate form of 0/0. Therefore, applying l’Hôpital’s rule, 
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